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Security Information

FEB 19 1952

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

18 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ESTIMATES STAFF

Subject: Task Team Membership and Assignments for SE-22


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1. [redacted]
(chairman)

2. Assignments: 25X1A9a

- I. A.
- B.
- C.
- D. 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

- II. A.
- B.
- C.
- D.
- E.
- F.
- G.
- H.
- I.
- J.
- K.
- L.
- M.



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Acting Chief, Estimates Staff

DOCUMENT NO. 2

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐

☐ DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 1981

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

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DATE: 19 FEB 81 REVIEWER: 10557

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

18 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR
Colonel B. B. Talley, G-2
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN
Colonel S. M. Lansing, JIG

SUBJECT : SE-22: Consequences of Certain Possible US
Courses of Action with Respect to Indochina,
Burma, or Thailand

1. The attached terms of reference for subject estimates have been approved by the Board of National Estimates and are forwarded for your consideration. A meeting of the IAC representatives has been scheduled for 10:00 A.M., Tuesday, 19 February, in accordance with the production schedule suggested in our memorandum of 15 February.

2. The attached terms of reference have been coordinated with the NSC Senior Staff Steering Committee. It is therefore believed that the major questions will remain as stated, and that the meeting on Tuesday will not affect these. Accordingly, and inasmuch as it is proposed to set a Thursday afternoon deadline, 21 February, for contributions, it is suggested that your offices begin work at once on contributions.

3. From a functional standpoint, OIR would be expected to contribute to all the items in the terms of reference, while the Defense agencies would have specific responsibility for only II-C and II-D. The Defense agencies may, however, contribute on other sections if they desire. It would be of some assistance to this office if the representatives of the Defense agencies could indicate at the Tuesday meeting the items on which they expect to contribute. [The Defense agencies may also wish to consider the desirability of designating one service agency as the coordinator of Defense contributions.]

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Acting Executive Secretary

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FORWARDED TO: TS S (G) 1991

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 19 FEB 52 REVIEWER: 010557

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Est. for NSC consideration at 5 Mar meeting
Must be delivered no later than AM 3 Mar
Last possible date for IAC Mtg is Sat 1 Mar.

Mon 25 Feb Board Review
T-W 26-27 Meetings with IAC Reps
Th 28 1 AC

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 February 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SE-22: CONSEQUENCES OF
CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH
RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND.

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the consequences of certain possible US courses of action with respect to an identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention* in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand.

SCOPE

The questions presented below, which further define the problem, fall into two categories: (1) those related to a possible

* The term "identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention" is intended to cover either an open and acknowledged military intervention or an unacknowledged military intervention of such a scale and nature that its existence could be demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt.

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US course of action in present circumstances, prior to any identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention in Burma, Indochina or Thailand, for the purpose of deterring such aggression; (2) those related to the situation after such a Chinese Communist military intervention had occurred. The response should be in broad terms and should deal with basic reactions, without wargaming the operations envisaged.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. PRIOR TO ANY IDENTIFIABLE CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND:

- A. What is the likelihood that the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand would agree in advance to join with the United States in taking military counteraction against Communist China in the event of an identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand?
1. Assuming that this military counteraction were limited to repelling the aggression in the area where it occurred?

*Covered by
assumption*

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Covered in Assumption

2. Assuming that the counteraction were to include attacks on targets in Communist China directly related to Chinese Communist operations in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand?
 3. Assuming that the counteraction were to include retaliatory operations with conventional weapons against Communist China in general?
 4. Assuming that the military counteraction envisaged were to include the use of atomic weapons?
- B. How would a joint warning of the military action envisaged in I-A affect Chinese Communist intentions? -- Soviet intentions? -- Sino-Soviet relations?
1. If the scope of the intended counteraction were not specified?
 2. If it were made clear that the intended counteraction would include retaliatory operations against Communist China itself?
 3. If the use of atomic weapons were threatened?

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4. If the warning were made publicly, or if it were given secretly through diplomatic channels?
- C. Would the participation of Asiatic governments (particularly Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, or India) in the joint warning be of any value? What is the likelihood that any such government would participate? What would be the effect of the participation of Nationalist China?
- D. What would be the effect of such a joint warning by the five powers:
 1. On the peoples and governments of Indochina, Burma, and Thailand?
 2. On other peoples and governments of East and South Asia?
 3. On non-participating NATO countries?
 4. Elsewhere (if any important effect is foreseen)?

II. IN THE ACTUAL EVENT OF IDENTIFIABLE CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND:

- A. Could the United Nations be led to declare Communist China the aggressor and to sanction:

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1. Military counteraction to repel the aggression?
 2. Retaliatory military action against Communist China in general?
- B. What additional moral and material support could the five powers expect to receive as a result of such UN sanction? What additional moral and material support might they receive even if the United Nations failed to take prompt and effective action?
- C. What would be the Chinese Communist reaction to the actual execution of retaliatory joint military counteraction against Communist China? -- the Soviet reaction? -- the effect on Sino-Soviet relations?
- D. What would be the psychological and political effect within Communist China of the actual execution of retaliatory joint military counteraction against Communist China itself:
1. If such counteraction were limited to naval blockade and the conventional bombing of selective targets?

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2. If such counteraction included a general air offensive including the use of atomic weapons?
- E. How would the peoples and governments of Indochina, Burma, and Thailand react to the actual execution of joint military counteraction against the Chinese Communist military intervention:
1. If such counteraction were limited to efforts to repel the aggression in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand?
 2. If such counteraction included naval blockade and the conventional bombing of selective targets in Communist China?
 3. If such counteraction included a general air offensive against Communist China including the use of atomic weapons?
- F. How would other peoples and governments in East and South Asia react to the actual execution of joint military counteraction against Communist China in each of the three cases indicated above?
- G. Would there be any important reactions elsewhere?

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- H. How would the powers engaged in this joint military action then regard the active employment of Chinese Nationalist forces against the Chinese Communists?
- I. What would be the reaction of the mainland Chinese to the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces against the Chinese Communists?
- J. How would other peoples and governments of East and South Asia then regard the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces against the Chinese Communists?
- K. If there had been no prior agreement such as that contemplated in I-A and if the United Nations failed to take prompt and effective action, would the United Kingdom and France be likely to join with the United States in retaliatory military action against Communist China itself? Would any other powers be likely to support the United States, United Kingdom, and France in these circumstances?
- L. What would be the consequences of unilateral US military action against China proper, all other powers having refused to participate?

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M. What would be the consequences, in the circumstances envisaged, if no effective military counteraction were taken against China proper?

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